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DESCRIPTION:   'Title: Route to bugs: Analyzing the security of BGP message
  parsing\n   When: Friday\, Aug 11\, 10:30 - 11:15 PDT\n   Where: Caesars 
 Forum - Academy - 407-410 - Track 4 - [1]Map\n   Speakers:Daniel dos Santo
 s\,Simon Guiot\n\n   SpeakerBio:Daniel dos Santos \, Head of Security Rese
 arch at Forescout\n   Daniel dos Santos is the Head of Security Research a
 t Forescout's\n   Vedere Labs\, where he leads a team of researchers that 
 identifies new\n   vulnerabilities and monitors active threats. He holds a
  PhD in\n   computer science\, has published over 35 peer-reviewed papers 
 on\n   cybersecurity\, has found or disclosed hundreds of CVEs and is a\n 
   frequent speaker at security conferences.\n\n   SpeakerBio:Simon Guiot \
 , Security Researcher at Forescout\n   Simon Guiot has experience in softw
 are engineering and software\n   vulnerability management. He is currently
  a Security Researcher at\n   Forescout Technologies doing vulnerability a
 nd threat research.\n\n   Description:\n   This talk discusses an overlook
 ed aspect of Border Gateway Protocol\n   (BGP) security: vulnerabilities i
 n how its implementations parse BGP\n   messages. Software implementing BG
 P is relied upon for Internet\n   routing and for functions such as intern
 al routing in large data\n   centers. A lot of (deserved) attention is giv
 en to aspects of BGP\n   protocol security discussed in [2]RFC4272\, which
  can be mitigated with\n   the use of RPKI and BGPsec. However\, recent BG
 P incidents show that it\n   might take only a malformed packet to cause a
  large disruption. We\n   will present a quantitative analysis of previous
  vulnerabilities in\n   both open and closed-source popular BGP implementa
 tions and focus the\n   talk on a new analysis of seven modern implementat
 ions.\n\n   Main findings in this research include:\n\n     1. Some implem
 entations process parts of OPEN messages before\n       validating the BGP
  ID and ASN fields of the originating router\,\n       which means that on
 ly TCP spoofing is required to inject malformed\n       packets.\n\n     2
 . Three new vulnerabilities in a leading open-source\n       implementatio
 n\, which could be exploited to achieve denial of\n       service on vulne
 rable peers\, thus dropping all BGP sessions and\n       routing tables an
 d rendering the peer unresponsive. These\n       vulnerabilities were foun
 d using a fuzzer we developed and will\n       release to the community.\n
 \n       REFERENCES\n\n               * [3]https://www.blackhat.com/presen
 tations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf\n\n               * [4]htt
 ps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4272\n\n               * [5]https://
 www.oecd.org/publications/routing-security-40be69c8-en.htm\n\n            
    * [6]https://www.zdnet.com/article/internet-experiment-goes-wrong-takes
 -down-a-bunch-of-linux-routers/\n\n   '\n\n   1. #CaesarsAcademyBR\n   2. 
 http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/rfc/rfc4272.txt\n   3. https://www.blackhat.
 com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf\n   4. https://d
 atatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4272\n   5. https://www.oecd.org/publicati
 ons/routing-security-40be69c8-en.htm\n   6. https://www.zdnet.com/article/
 internet-experiment-goes-wrong-takes-down-a-bunch-of-linux-routers/\n\n\n
DTEND:20230811T181500Z
DTSTART:20230811T173000Z
LOCATION:DC - Caesars Forum - Academy - 407-410 - Track 4
SUMMARY:Route to bugs: Analyzing the security of BGP message parsing
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