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DESCRIPTION:   'Title: Defender-Pretender: When Windows Defender Updates Be
 come a\n   Security Risk\n   When: Friday\, Aug 11\, 12:30 - 13:15 PDT\n  
  Where: Caesars Forum - Academy - 407-410 - Track 4 - [1]Map\n   Speakers:
 Omer Attias\,Tomer Bar\n\n   SpeakerBio:Omer Attias \, Security Researcher
  at SafeBreach Labs\n   Omer Attias is an accomplished security researcher
  with over five\n   years of experience in the field of cybersecurity. He 
 currently works\n   as a researcher at SafeBreach Labs.\n\n   With a backg
 round in the Ministry of Defense and the Israeli Defense\n   Forces (IDF)\
 , Omer has honed his skills in network research\, including\n   a deep und
 erstanding of Windows internals and Linux kernel components.\n\n   In addi
 tion to his professional pursuits\, Omer is a passionate\n   technology an
 d science enthusiast who is always eager to explore\n   emerging trends an
 d innovations in these fields.\n\n   Twitter: [2]@@omerat21\n\n   SpeakerB
 io:Tomer Bar \, VP of Security Research at SafeBreach Labs\n   Tomer Bar i
 s a hands-on security researcher with 20 years of unique\n   experience in
  cyber security. He leads SafeBreach Labs as the VP of\n   security resear
 ch. In the past\, he ran research groups for the Israeli\n   government an
 d then led the endpoint malware research for Palo Alto\n   Networks. His m
 ain interests are vulnerability research\, reverse\n   engineering\, and A
 PT research.\n\n   Among his recent discoveries are the PrintDemon vulnera
 bilities in the\n   Windows Spooler mechanism which were a candidate in th
 e best privilege\n   escalation of Pwnie awards and several research studi
 es on Iranian APT\n   campaigns. He presented his research at DEF CON (28-
 30)\, BlackHat USA\,\n   ReCon\, Sector\, Confidence\, Security Fest and H
 ackCon conferences.\n\n\n   Description:\n   The signature update process 
 is critical to EDR's effectiveness\n   against emerging threats. The secur
 ity update process must be highly\n   secured\, as demonstrated by the Fla
 me malware attack that leveraged a\n   rogue certificate for lateral movem
 ent. Nation-state capabilities are\n   typically required for such an atta
 ck\, given that signature update\n   files are digitally signed by Microso
 ft.\n\n   We wondered if we could achieve similar capabilities running as 
 an\n   unprivileged user without possessing a rough certificate\, instead 
 we\n   aimed to turn the original Windows Defender process to our full\n  
  control.\n\n   In this talk we will deep dive into Windows Defender archi
 tecture\, the\n   signature database format and the update process\, with 
 a focus on the\n   security verification logic. We will explain how an att
 acker can\n   completely compromise any Windows agent or server\, includin
 g those\n   used by enterprises\, by exploiting a powerful 0day vulnerabil
 ity that\n   even we didn't expect to discover.\n\n   We will demonstrate 
 Defender-Pretender\, a tool we developed to achieve\n   neutralization of 
 the EDR. allowing any already known malicious code\n   to run Fully Un-Det
 ected. It can also force Defender to delete\n   admin’s data. OS and dri
 ver files\, resulting in an unrecoverable OS.\n   We will also explain how
  an attacker can alter Defender's detection\n   and mitigation logic.\n\n 
   '\n\n   1. #CaesarsAcademyBR\n   2. https://twitter.com/@omerat21\n\n\n
DTEND:20230811T201500Z
DTSTART:20230811T193000Z
LOCATION:DC - Caesars Forum - Academy - 407-410 - Track 4
SUMMARY:Defender-Pretender: When Windows Defender Updates Become a Security
  Risk
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