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DESCRIPTION:   'Title: Exploring the hidden attack surface of OEM IoT devic
 es: pwning\n   thousands of routers with a vulnerability in Realtek’s SD
 K for eCos\n   OS.\n   When: Friday\, Aug 12\, 15:00 - 15:45 PDT\n   Where
 : Caesars Forum - Forum 104-105\, 135-136 (Track 1) - [1]Map\n   Speakers:
 Octavio Gianatiempo\,Octavio Galland\n\n   SpeakerBio:Octavio Gianatiempo 
 \, Security Researcher at Faraday\n   Octavio Gianatiempo is a Security Re
 searcher at Faraday and a Computer\n   Science student at the University o
 f Buenos Aires. He's also a\n   biologist with research experience in mole
 cular biology and\n   neuroscience. The necessity of analyzing complex bio
 logical data was\n   his point of entry into programming. But he wanted to
  achieve a deeper\n   understanding of how computers work\, so he enrolled
  in Computer\n   Science. An entry-level CTF introduced him to the world o
 f computer\n   security\, and there he won his first ticket to a security 
 conference.\n   This event was a point of no return\, after which he began
  taking\n   classes on computer architecture and organization and operatin
 g\n   systems to deepen his low-level knowledge. As a Security Researcher 
 at\n   Faraday\, he focuses on reverse engineering and fuzzing open and cl
 osed\n   source software to find new vulnerabilities and exploit them.\n  
  Twitter: [2]@ogianatiempo\n\n   SpeakerBio:Octavio Galland \, Security Re
 searcher at Faraday\n   Octavio Galland is a computer science student at U
 niversidad de Buenos\n   Aires and a security researcher at Faraday. His m
 ain topics of\n   interest include taking part in CTFs\, fuzzing open-sour
 ce software and\n   binary reverse engineering/exploitation (mostly on x86
 /amd64 and\n   MIPS).\n   Twitter: [3]@GallandOctavio\n\n   Description:\n
    In this presentation\, we go over the main challenges we faced during\n
    our analysis of the top selling router in a local eCommerce\, and how\n
    we found a zero-click remote unauthenticated RCE vulnerability. We\n   
 will do a walkthrough on how we located the root cause of this\n   vulnera
 bility and found that it was ingrained in Realtek’s\n   implementation o
 f a networking functionality in its SDK for eCos\n   devices.\n\n   We the
 n present the method we used to automate the detection of this\n   vulnera
 bility in other firmware images. We reflect on the fact that on\n   most r
 outers this functionality is not even documented and can’t be\n   disabl
 ed via the router’s web interface. We take this as an example\n   of the
  hidden attack surface that lurks in OEM internet-connected\n   devices.\n
 \n   We conclude by discussing why this vulnerability hasn’t been\n   re
 ported yet\, despite being easy to spot (having no prior IoT\n   experienc
 e)\, widespread (affecting multiple devices from different\n   vendors)\, 
 and critical.\n\n   Our research highlights the poor state of firmware sec
 urity\, where\n   vulnerable code introduced down the supply chain might n
 ever get\n   reviewed and end up having a great impact\, evidencing that s
 ecurity is\n   not a priority for the vendors and opening the possibility 
 for\n   attackers to find high impact bugs with low investment and little\
 n   prior knowledge.\n\n   '\n\n   1. https://defcon.outel.org/consolidate
 d_page.html#CaesarsForumBR\n   2. https://twitter.com/ogianatiempo\n   3. 
 https://twitter.com/GallandOctavio\n\n\n
DTEND:20220812T224500Z
DTSTART:20220812T220000Z
LOCATION:DC - Caesars Forum - Forum 104-105\, 135-136 (Track 1)
SUMMARY:Exploring the hidden attack surface of OEM IoT devices: pwning thou
 sands of routers with a vulnerability in Realtek’s SDK for eCos OS.
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